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‘Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place’:
Anti-discrimination Legislation in the Liberal
State and the Fate of the Australian Disability
Discrimination Act
PETER HANDLEY
University of East Anglia
This article offers a critical analysis of some of the practical implications for
disabled people of the Disability Discrimination Act of 1992. Speci cally, it
raises questions about politics and the role of the law as an instrument of social
change—taking greater account of the interests of disabled people—on the one
hand, and of the reliance of the social model of disability on a strategy based
upon legal rights on the other. The article also suggests that the constraining
effects of Australia’s constitutional protections of rights and its federal system
of government hinder the mildly progressive elements of the Disability Dis-
crimination Act. To illustrate this, the paper employs empirical evidence to
suggest that these effects have been exacerbated by the passage of the Human
Rights Legislation Amendment Act in 1999.
Over the last 30 years, the Anglo-American liberal democracies have seen a
considerable rise in the number and activity of new social movements and
single-interest pressure groups amongst which those of the mentally and physically
disabled have been relatively prominent. In common with women’s movements for
example, disability movements have lobbied hard for anti-discrimination legislation
to effect social change that takes greater account of their interests and which
establishes new sets of legal rights. Such has been the path followed in Australia,
a state with strong political and cultural connections with both the United Kingdom
and the United States and which enacted anti-disability discrimination legislation in
the shape of the Disability Discrimination Act (hereinafter DDA) in 1992.1
However, the author of this article is sceptical about such tactics and suggests
that the ‘liberal promise’ (Thornton 1990) of anti-discrimination legislation, that is
a more egalitarian distribution of opportunities and resources, is set to deliver at
Peter Handley is a full-time research student in the School of Economic and Social Sciences at the
University of East Anglia in the United Kingdom. He is completing a PhD in the area of disability and
the ef cacy of a rights-based approach to social justice.
1 All of Australia’s separate States and Territories have general anti-discrimination statutes that cover
race and sex discrimination as well as disability discrimination. For example, Anti-DiscriminationAct
(ADA) 1977 New South Wales, ADA 1991 Queensland, ADA 1992 Northern Territory, ADA 1998
Tasmania, Equal OpportunityAct (EOA) 1984Victoria, EOA 1984 South Australia,EOA 1984Western
Australia and the Discrimination Act 1991 Australian Capital Territory.
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516 PETER HANDLEY
very best only partial progress. The doubts expressed here are not new. For
example, some have questioned the ef cacy of liberal anti-discrimination legis-
lation with reference to the situation of women (see, for example, Thornton 1990;
Smart 1989; Mackinnon 1987).2 However, only with rare exceptions has such
critical attention been focused directly upon a consideration of the effectiveness of
anti-discrimination legislation with speci c reference to the disabled with the same
rigour (Gleeson 1999; Jones and Marks 1998; Gooding 1994). The issue is of
particular signi cance, though, in an age when anglophone governments routinely
engage in the rhetoric of ‘universal’ human rights, a commitment to social justice,
the eradication of social exclusion and the role of the active citizen.
This paper represents a contribution to just such a critical approach. More
speci cally, it raises questions about politics and the role of the law as an
instrument of social change on the one hand, and of the reliance of the social model
of disability upon a strategy based on legal rights on the other.
Importantly, the social model of disability has enabled us to conceive of
disability as more than just something an individual can or cannot do. The social
model has identi ed the disabling capacities of the built environment (such as
inaccessible buildings) and of institutional attitudes and practices (for example, in
taken-for-granted bureaucratic procedures) and distinguished these from impair-
ment de ned as physical and cognitive functional limitations (UPIAS 1976, 3–4).
This now dominant orthodoxy in disability studies, albeit in its many variations, is
contrasted with the otherwise more societally dominant medical model, with its
principal focus upon speci c disabling mental or physical conditions. For adherents
of this approach the disabled person must be changed—typically via the mediating
interventions of the medical professions and their attempts to effect cures—so that
the disabled person can be assimilated into society. For adherents of the social
model, on the other hand, society must change by dismantling environmental and
attitudinal barriers. It is this approach that has informed the disability movement’s
demands for legal rights as a central part of a strategy for social change.
However, disability movements have adopted this strategy rather too uncritically
by failing to appreciate suf ciently the problems of operationalising legal rights in
concrete situations (Handley 2000, 319–20). This article examines some of these
problems in the context of Australia, a society that places a high rhetorical premium
on its claims to possess a democratic political culture established on the values of
social justice and inclusivity.
The  rst part of the article brie y describes the DDA and its theoretical basis,
and the arguments for and against such forms of legislation are also brie y
outlined. The second part provides an overview of two interlinked elements of the
Australian constitutional system that constrain the rights established by the DDA;
these are,  rst, the protection of fundamental rights and, second, the federal system
of government. Finally, the third part of the article suggests that disabled people’s
rights are contingent upon these factors and employs empirical evidence to
illustrate this within the context of the current political–economic climate. In
particular, it discusses the possible implications for enforcing disabled people’s
rights in the light of key sections of the recently passed Human Rights Legislation
Amendment Act 1999 (hereinafter HRLAA).
2 Thornton’s study also considers the situation of ethnic minorities.
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‘CAUGHT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE’ 517
The Demands of the DDA
The enactment of the DDA in 1992 arguably demonstrated the Commonwealth
government’s intention to combat the long-standing social exclusion of disabled
people by the recognition of their legal rights. In common with their peers in other
liberal democratic states throughout the capitalist period, disabled Australians had
found themselves institutionalised, infantilised and patronised (see, for example,
Gleeson 1999; Barnes 1991; Kanter 1989). Such treatment was premised upon the
perceived inability of disabled people to ful l ‘normal’ roles in society, eg as
employees, employers or parents. The upshot of this situation has been one where
the vast majority of disabled people have lived a parallel existence, largely
marginalised from the social mainstream in violation of what would generally be
considered to be their fundamental human rights.
For a group as consistently disempowered as the disabled, the new rights
established by the DDA understandably kindled new hopes and expectations. These
centred upon the idea of a future fairer Australia where, as Brian Howe, then
Commonwealth Minister for Community Services and Health, put it
people with disabilities are regarded as equals, with the same rights as all other
citizens, with recourse to systems that redress any infringements of their
rights … where difference is accepted, and where public instrumentalities, com-
munities and individuals act to ensure that society accommodates difference.
(Howe 1992)
The DDA held out the promise of vastly improved social and economic opportuni-
ties for disabled people to take part in everyday Australian life via the acceptance
and accommodation of their difference. For example, to attend cinemas without
being refused entry on the basis that one represents a  re hazard, to compete with
others in the pursuit of a chosen career in a manner largely taken for granted by
able-bodied Australians or to be able to enter public buildings not by the back
entrance, because of inaccessibility, but by the front. Thus, it was believed that the
legislation would
constitute the legal basis for the protection and promotion of the rights of people
with disabilities and … .help to overcome social and economic disadvantage by
assisting people with disabilities to participate as equals in Australian society.
(Howe 1992)
Change, if it was to come, was not expected in the short term but hopes were high
that in the medium term, at least, Australian society would change appreciably for
the better for the majority of disabled Australians. One should also not underesti-
mate the extent to which the DDA has had immense symbolic signi cance for the
disabled. Such recognition legitimises one’s status and interests—where these were
formerly ignored or denied—imbues them with considerable moral import and
establishes the recipients as equal participants in a democratic whole.
Initial waves of optimism greeted the DDA in the period 1994–95 which saw
1229 complaints of discrimination lodged with the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunities Commission (HREOC), the Commonwealth agency responsible for
the enforcement of the legislation (HREOC 1995). Year on year, the number of
complaints lodged under Commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation have stead-
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518 PETER HANDLEY
ily decreased, prompting suggestions from some quarters that it was clearly having
its desired effect upon discriminators (Sydney Morning Herald 9 November 1998,
cited in Cabassi 2000). For example, in 1997–98 the number of complaints of
disability discrimination had dropped to 588 (HREOC 1998). By 2000 this
 gure had dropped again to 445 (HREOC 2000) down from the previous year’s
512 (HREOC 1999). This represents a drop of 63% in lodged complaints over six
years.
Despite the suggestion that the reductions in the numbers of complaints lodged
indicated the success of the DDA, organisations of disabled people increasingly
view the DDA as failing to deter discriminators or to address their marginal status
in Australian society. Early expectations surrounding the DDA have been viewed
retrospectively as ‘unrealistically high’ (Moxon 2000). The DDA itself is now seen
as a considerable disappointment, which raises questions about even more funda-
mental progress and change for disabled people. Much criticism has been levelled
at Commonwealth political institutions, such as HREOC, by advocates and activists
who consider that they have been let down by a failure to match political rhetoric,
of the sort exempli ed by Howe (1992), with purposive action. The argument
continues that such institutions ought to engage in positive action directed at
ensuring fully resourced and effective enforcement procedures as well as access to
those procedures which is sensitive to, and takes account of, the needs and
situations of disabled people.
A number of reasons suggest themselves as possible causal explanations for this
decline in complaints. First, as previously suggested, it may be that the DDA has
been so successful in tackling societal discrimination against disabled people that
they simply do not feel the need to complain of discrimination in the  rst place.
A second possibility is that complainants are opting increasingly for other, that is
State as opposed to Commonwealth, remedies for their complaints. A third
possibility might be that the decline in complaints to HREOC re ects a sense of
disillusionment amongst disabled people with the ability of the DDA to deliver on
its ‘promise’ of social change and so they are failing to complain in the belief that
there is little point. However, this article leaves these questions to one side for now
and returns to them in its  nal section.
Like its American role model, the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), the
DDA sought to make discrimination on the basis of disability unlawful. The DDA
also requires employers, service providers and so on to take disability into account
when considering disabled people for employment or in the provision of goods and
services, so that substantive outcomes are more equitable. That is to say, in addition
to the usual requirement of anti-discrimination legislation of forbearance on the part
of others, eg not to refuse to rent premises to a person with a disability simply
because they are ‘cripples’, the DDA also requires a degree of positive action on
the part of others to make appropriate adjustments for a disabled person’s speci c
requirements (Jones and Marks 1999, 192). For example, to adjust the disabling
aspects of a workplace in a bid to accommodate an individual’s impairments
[section 15].3
3 I do not wish to overstate the power of this notion, for it can be constrainedby the countervailingclaim
of ‘unjusti able hardship’ [section 11] by an employer or service provider if it is considered that an
accommodation imposes too stringent demands upon them, for example, in economic terms.
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‘CAUGHT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE’ 519
Such proactive requirements re ect the in uence of the social model and the
importance of combating environmental and attitudinal barriers to disability.
Additionally, should these positive requirements be neglected, the DDA provides
the mechanisms for disabled people to seek legal redress against those who fail to
take their disability into account.
Thus, the DDA’s requirements re ect moderately measures that, in the Ameri-
can context in particular, have come to be known as ‘af rmative action’ or, more
pejoratively, as ‘reverse discrimination’. However, in both theoretical and practical
terms, af rmative action has proved troublesome (see, for example, Mosley and
Capaldi 1996). Indeed, in recent years proactive measures aimed at blacks and
women have been removed in the face of sustained political and economic
opposition, as well as increased judicial pragmatism on the part of the Supreme
Court (Washington Post 27 June 1999). This opposition has crystallised around a
neoliberal political and economic agenda (Barry 1987) whose adherents view
af rmative measures as infringements of another’s liberty to choose and which
thus amount to state-sanctioned coercion. Consequently, such measures are viewed
as unfair to those individuals who may almost certainly have done nothing directly
to the particular disabled person and who are in turn viewed as persecuted
innocents.
However, the value of the social model of disability lies in its usefulness in
helping us to understand the extent to which discrimination against disabled
people cannot be conceptualised in quite such simple terms as the impaired
individual and the (typically able-bodied) individual perpetrator. The social model
has made clear the complex problems faced by policy makers to the extent that
addressing disability successfully demands a consideration of issues not tradition-
ally taken into account by ‘classic’ liberal anti-discrimination legislation. Attribu-
tions of guilt cannot be laid solely upon individual perpetrators, for this ignores
the social and historical context within which discrimination takes place (Thornton
1990, 35). Rather, as Schnaffer suggests, ‘sustained discrimination [of the sort
endured by disabled people] requires institutions and practices which impose
burdens and constraints on the target group without resort to repeated or individu-
alised discriminatory actions’ (Schnaffer 1983, emphasis added). The DDA at least
attempts to deal with the complexities of disability via the inclusion of its
af rmative measures that highlight the necessity for the needs and situation of
disabled people to be taken into account if more substantively equitable outcomes
are to be secured. However, despite this, these complexities do remain under-ap-
preciated, if not neglected completely, within many of the taken-for-granted
institutional settings and procedures of the liberal state.
The third part of this article illustrates this lack of appreciation of the complex
nature of disability implicit in recent Commonwealth human rights legislation.4
However, before that, the article moves on to consider some of the implications of
Australia’s constitutional arrangements upon operationalisation of the DDA’s
rights. These are,  rst, the protections of fundamental rights and, second, the
impact of the federal system.
4 I shouldmake it clear here that althoughthis paperfocusesupondisability,recent changestoAustralian
Human Rights legislation are likely to have equally adverse implications for Commonwealth sex and
race legislation.
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520 PETER HANDLEY
Australia’s Constitution
The Protection of Fundamental Rights
Despite the fact that Australia—in common with the United States—has a codi ed
Constitution, the Australian system’s conception of rights owes a good deal more
to the Westminster than to the American tradition. Like Britain, Australia has no
Constitutional bill of rights guaranteeing fundamental freedoms. Instead, the chief
function of the Australian Constitution is to set down the ‘disposition of powers
between the States and the Commonwealth, and to establish the institutions of
federal government’ (Maddox 1996, 129). Underlying this are British principles of
constitutionalism, based on a system of parliamentary responsible government,
which re ected the belief of the drafters that there was no need to append a written
bill of rights after the American model. In the Australian system, like the British,
fundamental rights were to be protected from tyrannical government by the
accountability of the executive to Parliament and, in turn, by Parliament’s account-
ability to the electorate.
To some in Australia, the maintenance of the Westminster tradition represents a
cherished continuity with the ‘mother country’ and con rmation that it has served
its purpose of safeguarding individual rights conspicuously better than its competi-
tors. Former Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies, for example, re ected that ‘the
rights of individuals in Australia are as adequately protected as they are in any
other country in the world’ because of ‘our inheritance of British institutions and
the principles of the common law’ (Menzies 1967, 54). However, such optimism
neglects the dangers posed to fundamental rights by the increased dominance of the
core executive and of the in uence of disciplined political parties (Galligan 1995,
158). That is to say, the legal rights of Australians subsist in a state of perpetual
danger, contingent upon the discretion of government which has the constitutional
power to repeal those rights should they see  t, for example in response to the
dictates of economic or political expediency.
To illustrate the extent to which fundamental, yet unexpressed, rights can be
threatened in the Australian system we might consider the case of Kruger v
Commonwealth (1997). The case concerned the forced removal of Aboriginal
children from their parents to institutions or reserves under the Aboriginals
Ordinance 1918 (NT). The plaintiffs argued that such actions violated a number of
unexpressed constitutional rights as well as the United Nations Genocide Conven-
tion rati ed by Australia in 1948. However, the High Court’s decision went against
the plaintiffs, prompting former High Court Chief Justice Sir Anthony Mason to
conclude that in ‘many jurisdictions’ such a decision ‘would be regarded as a
fundamental violation of human rights’ (Mason 1998, 43). Critics of the Australian
system highlight this and other such instances as evidence of the fragility of
fundamental rights and of the consequences of the absence of an American-style
bill of rights (see, for example, Charlesworth 1994).
There have been instances, though, where fundamental yet unexpressed consti-
tutional rights have been acknowledged and upheld by the courts, despite the
absence of a bill of rights. Hence, we might consider the often cited counter-exam-
ple of Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992). Here, the
High Court struck down an amendment to the Broadcasting Act 1942 (Common-
wealth) on the basis that the government had infringed citizens’ rights to free
speech, even though there are no such explicit rights in the Constitution. Similarly,
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‘CAUGHT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE’ 521
we might also consider the now famous decision in Mabo v Queensland (No. 2)
(1992), in which the High Court recognised the principle of native land rights as
one based upon implied constitutional rights.5
However, despite such instances of the court’s willingness to intervene in issues
of fundamental rights, its constitutional power to invalidate legislation on the
grounds that it infringes such rights comes into con ict with the Westminster-in-
spired notion of the sovereignty of Parliament, an unresolved tension that it is
beyond the scope of this paper to address in more depth.
However, in addition to the impact of parliamentary responsible government
upon attenuating rights, the effects of the Australian federal system and the
continually changing relationships between Commonwealth and State governments
further complicates their exercise in Australia. Therefore, to gain a fuller picture we
need to consider brie y the role of the federal system.
Australia’s Federal System
The federal system has been a consistent source of contention in Australian
political life. Equally, it has often been in a state of  ux as State and Common-
wealth governments almost constantly rede ne and renegotiate their respective
responsibilities within it.
For its supporters, federalism has a number of clear advantages. Among them is
its role in limiting the power of government and in increasing democratic partici-
pation and accountability (Galligan 1995, 51–3); in other words, by devolving a
degree of political power to subnational units in speci c areas of responsibility, the
system brings government ‘closer to the people’. However, federalism has had as
many critics as it has had supporters (see, for example, Riker 1964; Greenwood
[1946] 1976; Laski 1939). In particular, Riker—at least in his earlier work—noted
what he saw as federalism’s inherent conservatism, whilst both Laski and Green-
wood noted how this has tended to constrain the implementation of progressive
policy.
Essentially, the arguments for and against a federal system in Australia have
mirrored the main party political divisions in the country with the National and
Liberal Parties tending to favour it, whilst the Labor Party has tended to oppose it.
More recently, though, beginning with the Hawke administrations in the 1980s, the
Labor Party has become more reconciled to the concept to the extent that Hawke’s
tenure saw a substantial reversal in the  ow of responsibilities from the Common-
wealth to the States in areas such as taxation, education, transportation and social
policy, including disability. However, in order to avoid another of the pitfalls of
federalism, namely the duplication of responsibilities between the two levels of
government, that in Howe’s words had been ‘greatest in disability’ (Howe 1991, 5),
the various States’ health and welfare ministers arrived at the Commonwealth
States Disability Agreement (CSDA) (Yeatman 1996, xiii). The Agreement would
be  nalised when ‘each State had enacted complementary disability related legis-
lation’ (Cooper 1999, 221).
5 The court’s decisions on such issues have not always been so unambiguous. For example, in the
aftermath of Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996), supporters of both native title rights and of the rights
of pastoral leaseholders claimed that the court had attenuated their rights in favour of the other party
(CAA 1997).
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522 PETER HANDLEY
With this legislation now in place in all the States and Territories, it might be
suggested that disabled people now bene t from the choice to employ State or
Commonwealth procedures if they seek legal redress against a discriminator.
However, a disabled person’s choice in this matter is rather more circumscribed in
favour of State-based remedies than might at  rst be apparent. Two related factors
in particular lead to this observation;  rst, reduced infrastructural funding for
enforcement of the DDA at the Commonwealth level which, second, has meant that
disabled people are consequently under increasing pressure to employ State-based
over Commonwealth remedies (Cabassi 2000, 17–18).
The upshot of these two factors has been the hiving-off of rights protections back
on to the States. However, as Attridge points out, ‘The historical credentials of the
States to perform these functions is woeful’ (Attridge 1991, 3). It was, after all, the
raison d’eˆtre of the DDA to ‘regularise’ the unevenness with which rights were
protected from State to State by the introduction of Commonwealth legislation in
the  rst place (Thornton 1997, 188).
Today, then, the extent to which one might expect one’s rights to be protected
and enforced remains dependent upon the amount of resources that one’s home
State is prepared to commit for that purpose. In this sense, and in terms of concrete
effects, the current situation that faces disabled people appears little different from
that which preceded the DDA.
In substantive terms these two factors undercut the moderately progressive intent
of the DDA, and disabled Australians  nd themselves caught between something
of a ‘rock and a hard place’. They are caught between Commonwealth  nancial
retrenchments on the one hand and the recently increased emphasis on the role of
the States on the other.6 Latterly, this has received renewed impetus under the
Coalition administrations of John Howard which, true to their historical credentials,
have tended to be more sympathetic to the rationale of the federal system.7
However, if the States are to bear a greater share of the burden for any enforcement
provisions, then the historical credentials to which Attridge (1991) refers will need
to be addressed. However, the omens for optimism are less than encouraging. There
is little or no current evidence to suggest that the States are any more enthusiastic
about increasing public spending on rights enforcement infrastructures for disabil-
ity, or indeed sex and race discrimination, than the Commonwealth government.
This reluctance re ects the signi cance and in uence of wider changes in the
political and economic climate throughout the Anglo-American liberal democra-
cies. Namely, from one that displayed a general commitment to social democratic
values, and the level of government intervention and spending that this implied
across a wide sweep of issues, to one that now displays a general commitment to
neoliberal values which tend to eschew such interventions.8 With particular refer-
ence to the issue of disability in Australia these changes, beginning in the
mid-1970s in the United States, and in the 1980s in the United Kingdom and
Australia, have been characterised by the progressive withdrawal of the state from
6 There has been a marked increase in disability complaints lodgedwith the NSW Anti-Discrimination
Board, for example (Cabassi 2000; NSWADB 1999; NSWADB 2000).
7 There is no special disbene t here for disabled people. Those who lodge complaints of sex and race
discrimination confront similar problems raised by the federal system.
8 I do not wish to oversimplify here. There were, and of course still are, considerable differences in
approachbetween the Anglo-Americandemocracies in their speci c commitment to these sets of values.
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‘CAUGHT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE’ 523
many former welfare functions. However, whilst the disability movement has
welcomed the neoliberal critique of paternalist welfare policy (for example, in the
form of institutionalisation) on the one hand, they maintain the necessity for
welfare in the form of adequately funded means to seek redress for discrimination
on the other. There is no neat  t between these two ideals in the current political
and economic climate.
The  nal section illustrates how this con uence of constitutional factors, in
conjunction with the changed political and economic climate, is having substantive
effects upon HREOC and thus, in turn, upon disabled people who consider
employing legal remedies to combat discrimination. Furthermore, it suggests that
recent Commonwealth legislation has exacerbated these effects.
The Fate of the DDA
To recapitulate, the legal rights established by the DDA are vulnerable to attenu-
ation, if not outright repeal, under Australia’s system of parliamentary responsible
government. Moreover, recent shifts in State–Commonwealth responsibilities,
made possible by the renewed enthusiasm for coordinate federalism, have under-
mined the coherent, ‘Australia-wide’, operationalisation of these rights even fur-
ther. Here, this article turns to practical issues of operationalisation that have been
brought into sharp focus by the passage of the Human Rights Legislation Amend-
ment Act (1999). This suggests that major institutional practices still re ect
fundamental misunderstandings of the situation and needs of disabled people to
which the social model brings our attention.
As in cases of racial or sexual discrimination, if a disabled person considers that
their rights have been infringed then recourse to the law is the principal means of
redress. However, very many disabled people face problems that may make them
think twice about becoming involved in such a process. For example, the social
situation of disabled people results in many living on a below average income,
often in the form of state bene ts (Barnes 1991). To a large extent this  nancial
situation determines the degree to which they will be able to enforce their rights via
the legal system.9 In addition to this there is the strain upon the emotional
resources, not only of the individual concerned but also those of close relatives and
friends, who typically represent the main sources of such support. It is in these
areas that the Commonwealth government’s incremental  nancial retrenchment is
set to exacerbate existing disabling barriers.
As already indicated above, after an initial surge there has been a steady decrease
in the number of complaints being lodged with HREOC by disabled people since
1995. Indeed, as Thornton (1997, 185) suggests, complainants withdrew many
complaints before HREOC’s dispute resolution process even began. Of those
complaints that were accepted, most were settled privately at the initial conciliation
stage. After this, she continues, only 2% of all discrimination cases (which includes
sex and race, as well as disability cases) continued to the next tribunal stage of the
process (Thornton 1997, 185). However, once over these  rst two hurdles, and
assuming that the decision went the way of the complainant, registering the
tribunal’s decision in the Federal Court would render it binding; the tribunal’s
9 Once again, I do not wish to under-emphasise the extent to which women and Aboriginal people, for
example, also face similar ‘disabling’ barriers via this route.
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524 PETER HANDLEY
decision had the force of law (Cabassi 2000, 12). However, such instances were
rare, leading to the impression expressed by a former leading New South Wales
disability advocate that disabled people’s rights were, despite Sir Robert Menzies’
optimism, being consistently undermined and undervalued (Banks 1999b).
Moreover, to add to the growing perception of HREOC’s inability to adequately
enforce disabled people’s rights came the decision of the High Court in Brandy v
Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (1995) wherein the court held
that the Commission’s powers of enforcement, which were established only in
1994, were unconstitutional. The court held that HREOC’s powers infringed the
separation of powers in breach of Chapter 3 of the Constitution, ruling that the
issue of binding orders lies with the federal judiciary and not with administrative
agencies such as HREOC.
It was partly to address the stopgap post-Brandy arrangements, which involved
a second hearing before the Federal Court with freshly presented evidence, that the
HRLAA was conceived. Moreover, the stated rationale was that the new legislation
would only serve to make the rights of disabled people more secure (Williams
1999). However, to ensure that these rights were more secure, the new law would
need to facilitate, as far as possible, opportunities for exercising these rights. In
other words, it would need to ensure that disabled people would not be unduly
hindered by considerations of cost. Again, though, the omens were neither optimis-
tic nor particularly encouraging as the political and economic climate has remained
one of  nancial retrenchment in public spending.
Since being elected to of ce in 1996, the Howard Coalition government has
consistently reduced funding for HREOC (Pengelly 1997, 6–7). In the Common-
wealth budget of May 1997, the Commission’s funding was cut by 43%, whilst
funding for legal aid was also to be reduced by $120m over the subsequent three
years (Cabassi 2000, 10). These reductions have increased delays in the time taken
to deal with complaints, and have increased pressures upon complainants to opt for
State, rather than Commonwealth, remedies. In New South Wales, for example,
when expressed as a proportion of all discrimination complaints, there has been a
14% increase in disability complaints over the period 1994–2000 (Cabassi 2000),
whilst complaints at the Commonwealth level have continued to decline over the
same period (HREOC 1995, 1998, 1999, 2000).
Whilst such  nancial cutbacks may have rather less effect upon those with more
substantial resources, any adverse effects will only be magni ed for those whose
resources are more meagre. In addition, the Commonwealth government has
reduced funds for the Disability Discrimination Legal Centres (DDLC) established
by the DDA as a key element in the enforcement process to act as help and advice
centres for disabled people who seek access to legal redress. As Banks (1999a)
illustrates, there have been substantive results of this  nancial retrenchment. For
example, the New South Wales DDLC has suf cient funding to maintain only three
full-time workers in a State of some six million people, of which one million
self-identify as disabled; in Western Australia, with a land mass approximately
one-third that of the United States but with a population of just over a million
people, funding is only suf cient for ‘just over one person’ (Banks 1999a, 361–2).
The overall effect of the HRLAA looks set to compound the problems already
outlined. Two elements of the new act pose particular problems for anyone wishing
to seek legal redress in the event of being discriminated against. The  rst of these
is the replacement for the post-Brandy two-hearing system, and the second
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is the ‘costs follow the event’ rule in all discrimination cases that proceed to the
Federal Court.
The HRLAA dispenses with the post-Brandy stopgap two-hearing system and
transfers the hearing function of the HREOC directly to the Federal Court, thus
fusing stages 2 and 3 of the pre-Brandy arrangements.10 However, although
removing the emotional burden of two hearings from a complainant, the new
system still presents a considerable barrier to disabled people. For example, if a
complainant wishes to make the outcome of a conciliation conference binding, then
they have no choice but to appeal to the Federal Court with all of the attendant
 nancial burdens and emotional stress that goes with it. However, if we consider
the second proposal, concerning costs following the event, then this only serves to
compound the impact of the  rst upon the claimant and in addition re-emphasises
the lack of appreciation of disabled people’s situations and needs, and thus the
disabling capacity of the legal process.
As has already been made clear above, the social situation of many disabled
people is frequently unenviable in terms of income, employment opportunities and
so on. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that disabled people are
likely to be very risk-averse in situations of high uncertainty, and that the choice
to take discriminators to court will, for the vast majority of disabled people,
represent no choice at all. Faced with the option of letting the matter rest or of
engaging in a potentially ruinous court battle, the rational choice would appear to
be the  rst option. However, rather than focus on the disabling implications of the
‘costs’ rule through a reappraisal of the worth of increased funding for legal aid and
the DDLCs, the government has instead addressed the reluctance of lawyers to act
for low-income clients if their fees were not secured via the potential for a costs
order from the other party. Con dent in the belief that lawyers’ concerns have now
been addressed, the Commonwealth government is convinced that disabled people
will opt for litigation in the belief that it will now be easier for them to obtain legal
representation (Williams 1999).
It remains unclear how such a strategy will bene t those very many disabled
people on a low income or expand their realistic range of choices. Legal aid and
the DDLCs represent the most accessible means for disabled people to secure the
necessary legal representation if they wish to proceed to court; in a very real sense,
given adequate levels of funding legal aid, the DDLCs do represent signi cant
‘adjustments’ in ‘attitude’ and practice that ‘accommodate’ disabled people’s
difference in line with both the demands of the social model for positive action on
the part of government and society to foster social change. Accommodating the
interests of the legal profession instead, on the basis of the reasons described here,
would appear to be extremely optimistic. Moreover, even for those disabled people
who do possess the resources to take a discriminator to court independently, they
do so also under the very real threat of  nancial ruin by losing most of what they
own if any judgment were to go against them.
It could be argued, of course, that as the ‘costs follow the event’ rule is a
commonplace in other areas of civil litigation, so its extension to cover discrimi-
nation against disabled people represents a form of equality before the law.
10 The Federal Magistrates Service established by the Federal Magistrates Act (1999) has concurrent
human rights jurisdictionwith the Federal Court. Complainants therefore now have a further choice of
jurisdictions in which to proceed to hearing if conciliation is unsuccessful (Cabassi 2000, 24).
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However, if so, then it is equality of the most narrow and formal kind. Moreover,
it is one that neither recognises, nor takes suf cient account of, the social situation
of disabled people by accommodating their different-ness in the light of this.
To put it plainly: without such recognition, attempts to secure social change via
formal liberal equality for disabled people are unlikely to succeed on their own, and
the probable outcomes of the application of the ‘costs’ rule are likely to be highly
inequitable for disabled people. The limits of this formal approach were recognised
by President Lyndon Johnson, who initiated the beginnings of af rmative measures
in the United States to foster social change for women and blacks in his Great
Society Program. Johnson argued that formal equality on its own was not enough,
that not everyone set out in life from the same starting point or with the same
resources and that for these people more proactive measures were both justi ed and
necessary (Graham 1990).
It is, then, fanciful to suggest that the declining number of complaints reaching
HREOC is explicable in terms of the overwhelming success of Commonwealth
anti-discrimination legislation, such as the DDA, in eradicating discrimination
against disabled people (Sydney Morning Herald 9 November 1998, cited in
Cabassi 2000). A more likely explanation is the con uence of delays in the
Commonwealth enforcement process brought about by  nancial cutbacks that have
led to disillusionment with the process amongst disabled people. Consequently,
they are increasingly compelled to resort to State remedies that have received
renewed status under the increased latitude accorded them by Commonwealth
government. However, for moderately ‘progressive’ legislation such as the DDA,
the concerns of Riker (1964), Greenwood ([1946] 1976) and Laski (1939) about the
restraining potential of federalism would appear to have some basis in reality in the
Australian context and the fate of the DDA would seem to be one that is far from
secure.
When considered in the context of those measures in the HRLAA to which this
article has drawn attention, disabled people’s opportunities to exercise their rights
are, as Western Australian Labor Senator Chris Evans concludes, ‘being closed off’
(Evans 1999). Surely, such a charge poses a direct challenge to Australian claims
to be honouring those international human rights instruments to which it has put its
signature;11 additionally, it questions the widely held belief among Australians that
their political culture is innately democratic and that Australian citizens, irrespec-
tive of disability, race or gender have the right to a ‘fair go’.
Concluding Remarks
Despite the rhetorical commitment of Australian governments to ensuring that
‘society accommodates difference’ with reference to disabled people (Howe 1992),
actions—as it were—have spoken louder than words to the Australian disability
movement. Nine years after the DDA was enacted, and despite the rights that it
established, it has not become conspicuously easier for disabled Australians to
secure those rights.
Moreover, for movements like those of disabled people who struggle for social
11 With reference to disabled people these include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons
(1993).
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change, the Australian experience highlights the problematic nature of the relation-
ship between law (embodied in anti-discrimination legislation) as the principal
instrument of social change and politics. Enough has been said here to raise doubts
about its ef cacy in the case of disabled people in Australia in the face of the
constitutional opportunities to attenuate rights when set within the current political
and economic context.
The extent of the reliance of the Australian disability movement upon legal
rights, and thus by implication upon legal and political institutions to protect and
enforce them, is therefore something of a double-edged sword. Whilst, on the one
hand, these institutions do represent potential ‘enabling’ gateways into the social
mainstream, their failure to appreciate and make adjustments for the socio-historic
disadvantages of groups such as disabled people, on the other, results in their being
rather less helpful than one would hope.
Given these circumstances, the Australian disability movement faces a very
practical problem. Namely, how can the degree of positive action that the social
model demands on the part of government, and more widely society, realistically
be achieved in the context of a political and economic climate that looks set to be
resistant to such levels of intervention for the foreseeable future?
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